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Major Government Customers and Loan Contract Terms 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines how a firm’s business relationship with the U.S. 
government, in particular, sales to the government, impacts its loan contract terms and 
how the effect is different from that of major corporate customers. We find that firms 
with major government customers have a lower number of covenants and are less 
likely to have performance pricing provisions in their loan contracts than other firms, 
whereas major corporate customers do not have such impacts. We do not find 
evidence that major government customers affect the supplier firm’s loan spread, 
security, or maturity. We conjecture that lenders benefit from the strict monitoring 
activities of the government customer and reduce the use of covenants and 
performance pricing in loan contracts when the borrowing firm has a government 
customer.  
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1. Introduction  
A firm can be viewed as a “nexus of contracts” among various stakeholders (Jensen and 
Meckling [1976], Fama and Jensen [1983]). It is theoretically and empirically interesting how 
different contracting relationships interact with each other. In this paper, we investigate how a 
firm’s contracting relationship with its customers impacts its contracts with creditors.  In 
particular, we examine the effect of major government customers on the supplier firm’s loan 
contract terms, and how it differs from the effect of major corporate customers.  
Theoretically, the impact of major government customers on loan contract terms is 
unclear ex ante. On the one hand, although major corporate customers generally increase a 
supplier firm’s operating risk (e.g., Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim [2008], Dhaliwal, Judd, 
Serfling, and Shaikah [2016]), prior studies find that major government customers could reduce 
the supplier firm’s operating risk, for instance, because the government is unlikely to declare 
bankruptcy and federal procurement contacts are typically longer-term and explicit (e.g., 
Dhaliwal et al. [2016], Cohen and Li [2016a,b]). This reduced operating risk could lead to more 
favorable loan contract terms. In addition, the existence of a government customer may reflect or 
lead to political connections. Houston, Jiang, Lin, and Ma [2014] argue that political connections 
reduce credit risk and show that politically connected firms have lower cost of bank loans and 
lower likelihoods of a capital expenditure restriction and liquidity requirement covenants in their 
loan contracts. 
On the other hand, compared to other customers, such as individual, corporate, and 
nonprofit customers, the U.S. government as a customer is unique in that a government 
contractor is usually subject to financial audits and other reviews by the government, and the 
consequences of failing these audits and reviews could be very serious as the government is a 
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powerful customer. For instance, Oshkosh Corporation, which had approximately 45% sales 
from the U.S. government in 2012, clearly stated in its 2012 annual report that “like most large 
government contractors, the Company is audited and reviewed by the government on a continual 
basis” (see Appendix A). These audits and reviews could lead to “civil, criminal or 
administrative proceedings” in addition to adjustment of government contracts. It also stated that 
“under government regulations, a company or one or more of its subsidiaries can also be 
suspended or debarred from government contracts, or lose its export privilege based on the 
results of such proceedings.” 
The strict monitoring of major government customers could make supplier firms’ loan 
contract terms more or less favorable. If governments use their regulatory powers to expropriate 
benefits from their supplier firms, they may have adverse effects on their supplier firms’ 
operations and loan contract terms. Cohen and Malloy [2015] document consistent evidence on 
the adverse effect of having the government as a major customer. They find that firms with 
governments as major customers invest less in physical and intellectual capital, and have lower 
future sales growth. However, to the extent that government customers’ and lenders’ monitoring 
incentives overlap, lenders may benefit from government customers’ monitoring and allow more 
favorable loan contract terms for the supplier firm. For instance, due to the government’s 
relationship-specific investments in the supplier firm, it demands assurances that the supplier 
firm is economically and financially healthy and can continue to deliver on its promises (e.g., 
Cornell and Shapiro [1987]). Similarly, lenders also want to ensure that the borrowing firm has 
no financial difficulty and is able to repay interest and principal when they are due. In this sense, 
banks may benefit from government customers’ monitoring.  
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Using a large sample of loan contracts from 1995 to 2014, we document strong evidence 
that a loan contract contains significantly fewer covenants when it has a major government 
customer. We identify a customer as a major customer if it accounts for at least 10% of the 
supplier firm’s total sales (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. [2016]). Among loan contracts signed by the same 
firm, on average the number of covenants is lower by 0.7, which accounts for around 22% of the 
mean and standard deviation of the number of covenants in the sample, when the firm has a 
major government customer than otherwise. Interestingly, we do not find such an effect for a 
major corporate customer, and the effect of a major government customer on the supplier firm’s 
loan covenant intensity is statistically different from that of a major corporate customer.1 We 
find qualitatively similar results when measuring a firm’s dependence on major government and 
corporate customers with its percentage sales to them.2  
We further separately examine the effect of a firm’s business transactions with the 
government on the uses of general covenants and financial covenants. General covenants, 
sometimes referred to as negative and affirmative covenants, such as restrictions on dividend 
payout and capital expenditure, directly restrict managers’ operating, investment, and financing 
activities by specifying actions to be taken or not taken in certain conditions (Costello and 
Wittengberg-Moerman [2011]). Financial covenants, such as interest coverage and net worth 
covenants, require firms to adhere to a predetermined level of accounting performance 
(Christensen, Naikolaev, and Witternberg-Moerman [2016]). 3  We find that a loan contract 
                                                          
1 The insignificant effect of a major corporate customer could be due to the following reasons. On one hand, 
customer base concentration could increase the supplier firm’s operating risk (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. [2015]). On the 
other hand, major corporate customers have incentives and powers to monitor the supplier firm due to their stakes in 
the firm (e.g., Cornell and Shapiro [1987], Hui, Klasa, and Yeung [2012]).  
2 We find that other major customers (e.g., individuals and nonprofit organizations) have a positive effect on loan 
covenant intensity. We conjecture that these major customers increase the borrowing firms’ operating risk but 
generally do not monitor the borrowing firm effectively.  
3  Christensen et al. [2016] note that although both the agency and incomplete contracting perspectives offer 
complementary approaches to understanding the role of covenants, general covenants seem to be more consistent 
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contains fewer general as well as financial covenants when it has a major government customer 
or when its sales from the government increases.  
We also examine the effect of major government customers on other loan contract terms. 
We find that major government customers have no significant effects on loan spread, collateral 
requirement, or loan maturity and their effects on these loan contract terms are statistically 
indistinguishable from that of major corporate customers. In contrast, we find that firms with 
major government customers or higher government sales are less likely to have performance 
pricing provisions in their loan contracts and we do not find a similar effect for major corporate 
customers. Further, the effect of major government customers on the use of performance pricing 
is significantly more negative than that of major corporate customers.  
The difficulty with identifying the impacts of government customers on loan contract terms 
is that certain firms select the government as a major customer or the government may select 
certain firms as its suppliers. Thus, all the empirical results we document may simply be a 
function of those firms’ characteristics, not of the fact that they have a major government 
customer. We employ several approaches to address this endogeneity concern. First, we utilize a 
difference-in-difference design by incorporating both firm and year fixed effects into the 
regressions (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan [2003], Valta [2012]). The firm fixed effects control 
for time-invariant firm characteristics that are likely associated with a firm’s having a major 
government customer, allowing the estimation of the effect of within-firm changes in a firm’s 
business transaction with the government on loan covenant intensity. The year fixed effects 
control for common time variant factors, such as macroeconomic conditions. As Bertrand and 
Mullainathan [2003] explain, this design is essentially a difference-in-difference design.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
with the agency view that covenants are used to restrict agency problems, while financial covenants seem to be more 
consistent with the incomplete contracting view that covenants are used to allocate control rights more efficiently.  
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Second, in addition to examining the direct effect of government customers on loan 
covenant intensity, we compare the effect of government customers with those of major 
corporate customers and other major customers. This approach allows us to control for the 
common effects of major customers on loan contract terms as well as firm characteristics that are 
related to the existence of major customers. Finally, we employ an instrument variable analysis. 
To identify exogenous change in a firm’s business transaction with the government, we explore 
the change caused by the government’s purchase behavior. Specifically, we use the total 
government sales of each three-digit SIC industry scaled by total industry sales as an instrument 
variable for our treatment variable. We find qualitatively similar results.  
While our main goal is to examine the overall effect of major government customers on a 
supplier’s loan contract terms and how it differs from the effect of major corporate customers, 
we also attempt to shed light on whether the negative effect of major government customers on 
covenant intensity and the use of performance pricing is due to lower operating risk associated 
with government sales or enhanced monitoring by government customers. We conjecture that 
enhanced monitoring might be the primary channel for the following reasons. 4  First, if the 
primary channel is the reduced risk, one should be able to observe a similar effect in loan spread 
and collateral requirement because these two terms are sensitive to the borrowing firms’ credit 
risk (e.g., Berger and Udell [1990], Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder [2008]).  However, we do not 
find such effects. As loan covenants and performance pricing are mainly used to reduce the 
agency problem between borrowers and lenders (Jensen and Meckling [1979], Asquith, Beatty, 
and Weber [2005]), the negative effect of major government customers on covenant intensity and 
                                                          
4 We acknowledge that this conclusion is at most conjectural. However, this will not dilute our contribution to the 
literature because we focus on the effect of major government customers on the supplier firm’ loan contract terms.  
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performance pricing, combine with their insignificant effect on loan spread and security, 
suggests that enhanced monitoring is likely the primary channel.  
Second, to further explore whether major government customers reduce credit risk, we 
examine their effect on the expected default likelihood and CDS spread of the supplier firm and 
find insignificant results. Third, if the primary channel is the reduced risk, we expect for firms 
with major government sales, covenant intensity and the use of performance pricing will be 
lower if the supplier firm has more government sales, because a higher level of government sales 
will reduce operating risk further. However, we do not observe such an effect. This finding 
suggests that our covenant and performance pricing results are mainly driven by firms switching 
from having no major government sales to having major government sales. It appears more 
consistent with the monitoring explanation because for this channel what matters is the existence 
of a major government customer.5  
Our study makes several contributions. First, we contribute to the literature on how a firm’s 
customer base characteristics affect firm fundamentals and corporate outcomes (e.g., Patatoukas 
[2012], Dhaliwal et al. [2016]). We show that firms with major government customers have a 
lower number of covenants and are less likely to have performance pricing provisions in their 
loan contracts, whereas major corporate customers do not have such impacts. Our study adds to 
the emerging line of studies that investigate the effects of government customers (e.g., Banerjee 
et al. [2008], Dhaliwal et al. [2016], Cohen and Li [2016a,b], Cohen and Malloy [2015]).      
Second, we contribute to the debt contracting literature by showing that lenders can benefit 
from the monitoring of borrowing firms by other stakeholders, in particular, the government as a 
major customer. Extant studies focus on how a lender can benefit from other lenders’ monitoring 
                                                          
5 However, we acknowledge that the insignificant effect of government sales for the sample of firms with major 
government customers could be also due to the limited test power.  
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of the borrowing firm (e.g., Beatty, Liao, and Weber [2012]). The finance literature has long 
recognized that delegating monitoring to other “specialist” creditors can reduce monitoring costs 
when borrowers have multiple classes of lenders (e.g., Diamond [1984]). Beatty et al. [2012] 
show that bondholders can delegate monitoring to other creditors through cross-acceleration 
provisions. We extend this literature by showing that banks can also “free ride” the monitoring 
from the government as a major customer.     
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional 
background. Section 3 reviews the related literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 4 
describes the data and presents summary statistics. Section 5 presents our empirical analysis. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Institutional Background 
The U.S. government is an important customer of public and private firms. It purchases 
many of the products and services it needs from suppliers who meet certain qualifications. The 
federal government spends more than $500 billion a year on private sector contractors, which 
accounts for around 14% of the federal budget.6 The federal, state, and local governments apply 
standardized procedures to purchase goods and services. Government contracting officials use 
procedures that conform to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which is standardized set 
of regulations used by all federal agencies in making purchases. When the government wants to 
purchase a certain product or service, it can use a variety of contracting methods, for instance, 
sealed bidding and contracting by negotiation.   
                                                          
6 CNN Monday, 2012: “Cutting Washington Could Hit Main Street.” Source: 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/23/news/economy/federal-spending/. 
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In the basic federal procurement process, acquisition personnel, after determining their 
agency’s requirements (that is, the goods and services the agency needs), post a solicitation on 
the Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) website. Interested companies prepare their 
offers in response to the solicitation, which are evaluated by agency personnel in accordance 
with applicable provisions of FAR. A company can also become a subcontractor of a 
government contractor. To be eligible to compete for government contracts, a company must 
obtain a Data Universal Numbering System number and register with the federal government’s 
System for Award Management (Halchin [2012]).   
Government customers are different from corporate customers and other customers in 
several ways. First, government spending is subject to strict public monitoring. For instance, the 
Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) was signed on September 26, 
2006 with the intent to empower every American with the ability to hold the government 
accountable for each spending decision. It requires information on federal awards (federal 
financial assistance and expenditures) be made available to the public via a single, searchable 
website (USAspending.gov). 
Second, the U.S. government engaged in strict monitoring of their corporate suppliers.  A 
U.S. government contractor is usually subject to financial audits and other reviews by the 
government for issues related to the government contracts. The consequences of failing these 
audits and reviews could be very serious as the government is a powerful customer. These audits 
and reviews could lead to not only adjustment of government contracts, but also civil, criminal, 
or administrative proceedings.  For instance, Halliburton Company, which contracts with U.S. 
Department of Defense and other governmental agencies, disclosed in its 2003 annual report that 
Department of Defense officials referred an audit dispute to the Defense Contract Audit 
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Agency’s inspector general with a request for additional investigation by the agency’s criminal 
division (see Appendix A). The company also had inquiries in the past by the civil fraud division 
of the U.S. Department of Justice into possible contract overcharges. Oshkosh Corporation, 
which has approximately 45% sales the U.S. government in 2012, clearly stated in its 2012 
annual report that “like most large government contractors, the Company is audited and reviewed 
by the government on a continual basis” (see Append A). It also stated that “under government 
regulations, a company or one or more of its subsidiaries can also be suspended or debarred from 
government contracts, or lose its export privilege based on the results of such proceedings.”  
Third, government purchases are typically regulated by longer-term procurement contracts 
(Goldman, Rocholl, and So [2013]) and a significant portion of these contracts use cost-plus 
pricing (Dhaliwal et al. [2016]). Cost-plus or cost-reimbursement contracts pay a contractor for 
all of its allowed expenses and an additional payment that allows a contractor to make a profit. 
Cost-plus contracts, particularly those with fixed fees, are criticized for providing insufficient 
incentives for contractors to reduce costs. To mitigate this problem, some cost-plus contracts 
provide a larger fee for contracts that meet or exceed performance targets such as cost savings.  
 
3. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
3.1. Prior Studies on Customer Base Characteristics  
Prior studies have linked customer base characteristics, such as customer relationship and 
customer base concentration, with firm fundamentals and corporate strategies. Empirical studies 
generally support that customer relationship is positively associated with firms’ future 
performance (e.g., Ittner and Larcker [1998], Nagar and Rajan [2005], Gruca and Rego [2005]). 
For instance, using a unique and proprietary cross-sectional data set of the retail banking 
industry, Nagar and Rajan [2005] find that customer relationships is positively associated with 
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the supplier firm’s future profits.   Customer base concentration has been shown to be positively 
associated with firms’ operating risk, because relationship breakdown with or demand 
fluctuation from major customers can have material adverse impacts on firms’ performance. For 
instance, Dhaliwal et al. [2016] documents that customer base concentration measure is 
positively associated with the implied cost of equity capital. Banerjee et al. [2008] show that 
some firms with major customers maintain low leverage to protect themselves from the adverse 
effects of losing major customers. Becchetti and Sierra [2003] document that customer 
concentration is positively associated with firm bankruptcy risk. 
Prior studies have documented mixed evidence on the impacts of customer base 
concentration on the supplier firm’s performance. Kim [1996] finds that major customers 
significantly reduce big firms’ profit margins, whereas the results with medium or small firms 
are insignificant. Patatoukas [2012], however, show that customer base concentration is 
positively associated with accounting performance and asset utilization. Irvine, Park, and 
Yildizhan [2016] follow up Patatouka’s [2012] work and show that the relation between 
customer-based concentration and profitability is significantly negative in the early years of the 
relationship, but becomes positive as the relationship matures.  
Prior studies also recognize that major government customers could have different 
impacts on firm fundamentals and corporate strategies. Dhaliwal et al. [2016] argue that firms 
reporting the U.S. government as major customers may have lower operational risk, because (i) 
the federal government is unlikely to declare bankruptcy, and (ii) federal procurement contacts 
are typically longer-term and explicit, and (iii) a non-trivial fraction of those contracts use cost-
plus pricing, which assign less risk to the firm than to the government. Consistent with these 
arguments, they document that these firms have lower implied cost of equity capital; Cohen and 
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Li [2016a,b] find that these firms have better profitability and lower operational uncertainty. A 
recent paper by Cohen and Malloy [2015], however, provide evidence on the adverse effect of 
having the government as a major customer. They find that firms with the government as major 
customer invest less in physical and intellectual capital, and have lower future sales growth. 
 
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
Major government customers could affect the supplier firm’s loan contract terms through 
multiple channels. First, as we discuss in Section 3.1, although major corporate customers 
generally increase a supplier firm’s operating risk (e.g., Banerjee et al. [2008], Dhaliwal et al. 
[2016]), prior studies find that major government customers could reduce the supplier firm’s 
operating risk (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. [2016], Cohen and Li [2016a,b]). This reduced operating risk 
could lead to more favorable loan contract terms. Second, the existence of a government 
customer may reflect or lead to political connections. Houston et al. [2014] argue that political 
connections reduce credit risk and show that politically connected firms have lower cost of bank 
loans and lower likelihoods of a capital expenditure restriction and liquidity requirement 
covenants in their loan contracts.  
Third, as we discuss in Section 2, the U.S. government engaged in strict monitoring of 
their corporate suppliers.  A government contractor is usually subject to financial audits and 
other reviews by the government.  If governments use their regulatory powers to expropriate 
benefits from their supplier firms, they may have adverse effects on their supplier firms’ 
operations and loan contract terms. For instance, Cohen and Malloy [2015] document consistent 
evidence on the adverse effect of having the government as a major customer. Finally, the strict 
audits and reviews by the government agencies for government contractors may reduce lenders’ 
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monitoring need, which may result in more favorable contract terms, such as fewer covenants, 
given the direct and indirect costs of covenants.7  Lenders can benefit from the government 
customer’s monitoring activities because they share the goal of ensuring that the firm is 
economically and financially healthy to fulfill its promises of providing quality products to the 
government customer or repaying debt to the lenders.  
Given the mixed predictions from the above arguments, we propose the following non-
directional hypotheses:  
H1: The presence of major government customers is not related to the supplier firm’s loan 
contract terms.  
H2: The effect of major government customers on the supplier firm’s loan contract terms is 
not different from that of major corporate customers.   
We examine the following major loan contract terms: covenant intensity, performance 
pricing provision, interest spread, loan maturity, and collateral requirement. The agency theory 
argues that debt covenants mitigate agency problems between debt holders and shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling [1976], Myers [1977], Smith and Warner [1979]). The incomplete 
contracting theory, which provides another theoretical perspective on debt covenants, 
emphasizes control rights and views covenants as a tool to more efficiently allocate control rights 
(Grossman and Hart [1986], Hart and Moore [1988, 1990], Aghion and Bolton [1992]). Both 
theories predict that firms with more agency problems have more covenants in their loan 
contracts.  
Performance pricing provisions in loan contracts link bank interest rate spreads to 
borrowers’ performance measures, such as credit ratings and debt to EBITDA ratio. Asquith et 
                                                          
7 The direct costs of covenants include the costs of negotiating, implementing, and renegotiating the covenants. The 
indirect costs include the adverse effects of covenants on the borrowing firm’s investment, financing, and operating 
activities. 
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al. [2005] suggest that performance pricing provisions are more common when the potential for 
adverse selection and moral hazard is higher. Shorter debt maturity enables more frequent 
monitoring by the lender (Diamond [1991], Rajan and Winton [1995]). Armstrong, Guay, and 
Weber [2010] argue that reduction in maturity can be a substitute for accounting based covenants 
in monitoring the borrower. Loan spread and security are negatively associated with the 
borrowing firm’s credit quality (Holmstrom and Tirole [1997], Stulz and Johnson [1985], Boot, 
Thakor, and Udell  [1991], Asquith et al. [2005], Berger and Udell [1990]).  
 
4. Data and Summary Statistics 
4.1. Sample Selection  
We obtain major customer data from Compustat segment files, which provide the types 
and names of major customers of U.S. public firms along with the dollar amounts of annual sales 
to the customers. The Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 14 (SFAS 14), which 
was issued by the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) in 1976, requires a supplier to 
disclose external customers that individually account for 10% or more of its revenues. Although 
SFAS 14 was later superseded by SFAS 131, the requirement to disclose such customers remains 
intact for public firms under SEC Regulation S-K Item 101. Despite of the disclosure 
requirement of 10% or more revenues, public firms often voluntarily report external customers 
that generate less than 10% of total sales.  
We obtain data on loan characteristics from the Dealscan database. Dealscan is provided 
by Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) and contains a wide range of loan characteristics, such as 
loan amount, interest spread, and covenants. We merge the Dealscan data to Compustat using the 
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linking table provided by Dealscan, which is based on Chava and Roberts [2008].8 After merging 
Dealscan with Compustat segment files, excluding financial and utilities firms, and requiring the 
availability of control variables in the multivariate analyses, we obtain 11,774 loan packages 
issued by U.S. public firms over years 1995–2014.9 We further require each firm to have at least 
two loans in order to implement firm fixed effects estimation. Our final sample consists of 
10,671 loan packages issued by 2,183 firms.  
 
4.2. Variable Measurement and Summary Statistics 
Our main measure of the government customer is an indicator variable, SaleGov dummy, 
which equals one if a firm discloses the U.S. government as a major customer and zero 
otherwise.10 Although a firm may voluntarily disclose a customer with sales below 10%, we 
follow Dhaliwal et al. [2016] and define a major customer as one that accounts for at least 10% 
of the supplier firm’s sales.11 To compare the effect of major government customers with those 
of other types of major customers, we also create another three indictor variables, SaleFirm 
dummy, SaleOther dummy, and SaleMajor dummy. SaleFirm dummy, which measures the 
existence of major corporate customers, equals to one if a firm has a major corporate customer 
and zero otherwise. SaleOther dummy measures the presence of other major customers; it equals 
                                                          
8 For recent loans that are not covered by the linking table in Dealscan, we match them to Compustat manually 
based on company names and addresses.  
9 A loan package specified in a loan contract may contain multiple loan facilities with different characteristics (e.g., 
maturities, interest spreads, and repayment schedules). All facilities in a loan package are governed by the same set 
of covenants. Thus, we perform covenant related analyses at the loan package level and facility related analyses, 
such as analyses of loan spread, security, and performance pricing provisions, at the facility level.  
10 The indicator variable, SaleGov dummy, equals one if a firm generates at least 10% of its annual total sales from 
the U.S. federal government, a state government, or a local government. Most (over 90% of) firm-year observations 
have the federal government as a major customer, whereas few observations have a state government or a local 
government as a major customer. Our results are robust to the exclusions of state governments and local 
governments.  
11 As Dhaliwal et al. [2015] note, defining a major customer as one with at least 10% of sales mitigates the potential 
selection bias related to firms’ voluntarily reporting customers with sales lower than 10%. In sensitivity analyses, we 
also include customers that account for less than 10% of total sales. Our results (not tabulated) hold.  
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to one if a firm reports a non-government and non-corporate major customer (e.g., an individual 
or nonprofit organization) and zero otherwise. SaleMajor dummy captures the existence of any 
major customer; it equals one if a firm has any major customer and zero otherwise.  
In addition to these indicator variables, we also measure a firm’s business relation with a 
certain type of major customers with the percentage sale to these customers. These variables, 
labeled as SaleGov%, SaleFirm%, SaleOther% and SaleMajor%, represent a firm’s percentage 
sales to major government customers, major corporate customers, other major customers, and all 
major customers, respectively.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample. On average, 69% of firms have at 
least one major customer, 9% have at least one major government customer, 46% have at least 
one major corporate customer, and 24% have at least one other major customer. On average, 
major customers account for 33% of a firm’s total sales; major government and major corporate 
customers account for 3% and 17% of a firm’s total sales, respectively. Firms that report the U.S. 
government as a major customer generates 38% of annual sales from the transactions with the 
government. Firms that report major corporate customers generate 36% of annual sales from 
these customers. Although major corporate customers are more common than government 
customers, percentage sales from these two types of major customers are comparable.  
An average firm in our sample has total assets of 4.5 billion dollars. On average, a firm has 
a leverage ratio of 29%, profitability of 13%, the market-to-book ratio of 1.73, and  tangibility 
ratio of 30%. These variables are defined in Appendix B. Half of firms in our sample have credit 
ratings. Conditional on being rated, an average firm has a credit rating of 11, corresponding to 
S&P’s BB+ rating. The average loan amount is $415 million dollars and the average loan 
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maturity is 46 months.12 On average, a loan package contains 1.64 financial covenants and 1.61 
general covenants. The average loan interest spread is 203 basis points above LIBOR (London 
Interbank Offer Rate). On average, 75% of loan facilities are secured, and 44% of loan facilities 
contain performance pricing provisions.  
As reported in Table 2, the sample firms cover most major economic sectors (Fama-French 
12 classification industries), with the largest fraction in manufacturing (18.4%). The likelihood 
of having a major government customer is the highest in the following two industries:  
Healthcare, medical equipment, and drugs (22%) and business equipment (15%). On average, 
8.9% and 6.0% of sales of firms in these two industries are generated from major government 
customers.13 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1 Research Design 
We estimate the following model to examine the effect of major government customers 
on loan contract terms: 
Loan term = α + β1SaleGov dummy + β2SaleFirm dummy+ β3SaleOther dummy  
+ β4Firm Controls + β5Loan Controls + Credit Rating FE   
+Loan Type FE + Loan Purpose FE + Firm FE + Year FE + ε,     (1) 
where SaleGov dummy,  SaleFirm dummy, and SaleOther dummy are as defined in Section 4.2. 
Loan term is one of the loan contract terms we investigate. Following prior studies (e.g., 
Demiroglu and James [2010], Bradley and Roberts [2015]), we quantify the use of loan 
                                                          
12 For a loan package with multiple facilities, we report the amount weighted average maturity of all facilities.  
13 At the finer industry level (Fama-Frech 49 industries), the likelihood of having a major government customer is 
the highest in the following three industries: defense (63%), healthcare (49%), and aircraft (45%). On average, 32%, 
20%, and 16% of sales of firms in these industries, respectively, are from government customers. 
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covenants by simply counting them (All covenants). We also separately examine the effect of 
major government customers on the number of general covenants (General covenants) and the 
number of financial covenants (Financial covenants).  
An important challenge in identifying the causal effect of the existence of major 
government customer on loan covenant intensity is that firms with significant business 
transactions with the government may be fundamentally different from other firms. For instance, 
Cohen and Li [2016a,b] document that these firms are smaller, more profitable, and have less 
volatile earnings than firms that have no government customers. As a result, the estimated effect 
of SaleGov dummy on loan contract terms could be due to omitted firm characteristics that are 
associated with both the presence of a major government customer and covenant intensity.  
We attempt to address this endogeneity concern in several ways. First, we follow prior 
studies (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan [2003], Valta [2012], Christensen et al. [2013]) and 
incorporate both firm and year fixed effects into equation (1). Firm fixed effects fully controls 
for unobservable time-invariant differences between firms with and without government 
customers, allowing the estimation of the effect of within-firm changes in the existence of a 
major government customer on covenant intensity. The year fixed effects control for common 
time variant factors, such as macroeconomic conditions. As Bertrand and Mullainathan [2003] 
explain, with this approach, for a firm that experiences a change in SaleGov dummy in a given 
year, all sample firms that do not experience a change in that year serve as control firms. In this 
sense, equation (1) is essentially a difference-in-difference design (Bertrand and Mullainathan 
[2003], Valta [2012]).   
Second, in addition to estimating the treatment effect of SaleGov dummy, we also compare 
it with the effects of SaleFirm dummy and SaleOther dummy. We expect β1 to be more negative 
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than β2 and β3. This approach will rule out that the documented effect of SaleGov dummy is due 
to the effect of having a major customer, not due to the unique feature of having a major 
government. In addition, to the extent that we document a differential effect of SaleGov Dummy, 
it will add to prior studies that show government and major corporate customers have 
significantly different impacts on firm fundamentals and corporate strategies (e.g., Dhaliwal et 
al. [2016], Cohen and Li [2016a,b], Cohen and Malloy [2015]).  
We follow prior studies and control for firm and loan characteristics that are possibly 
associated with covenant intensity (e.g., Graham, Li, and Qiu [2008], Costello and Wittengberg-
Moerman [2011]). Specifically, we control for the following firm characteristics that are possibly 
associated with credit quality: firm size (Log(Assets)), leverage ratio (Leverage), asset tangibility 
(Tangibility), returns on assets (Profitability), market-to-book ratio (Market to book), and the 
volatility of operating cash flows (Cash flow volatility). These variables are defined in Appendix 
B. To capture the effect of monitoring activities by the borrowing firms’ existing creditors, we 
also include the number of covenants (Prior covenants) that are already specified in the 
borrowing firm’s existing loans and bonds at the time when the new loan is originated (e.g., Lou 
and Otto [2015]).14   
To further control for the effect of borrowing firms’ credit quality, we include fixed 
effects for all credit rating categories, including an indicator variable for unrated firms. This 
specification allows us to control for any possible nonlinear effect that a borrower’s credit rating 
may have on covenant intensity. We also control for the following loan characteristics: the 
                                                          
14 Consistent with the new lenders delegating monitoring to existing lenders, Lou and Otto [2015] document that 
when a firm has more covenants outstanding, its new loan contains fewer covenants. The number of prior covenants 
is based on data for previously issued loans and bonds from DealScan and Mergent FISD. If the same covenant is 
included in multiple outstanding loans or bonds of the borrowing firm, we count the covenant only once. Dropping 
the number of prior covenants from the regressions does not change our results. 
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natural logarithm of loan amount (Log(Amount)) and maturity (Log(Maturity)).15 We further 
include fixed effects for loan types and loan purposes. Finally, we cluster the standard errors by 
each firm to account for potential within-firm dependence in the error terms.  
We estimate an OLS model for all loan terms. When the dependent variable is All 
covenants, General covenants, or Financial covenants, we also estimate a Poisson model. We 
also estimate a conditional logit model when the dependent variable is the use of performance 
pricing (Performance pricing) or collateral requirement (Loan security). Although nonlinear 
models with firm fixed effects are generally subject to the incidental parameters problem, the 
coefficients of a Poisson model and a conditional logit model with firm fixed effects can be 
consistently estimated because it has no problem of incidental parameters (Wooldridge [2002], 
Cameron and Trivedi [2005]). 
 
5.2 The Effect of Major government Customers on Loan Covenant Intensity 
Table 3 presents the regression estimates of equation (1). To provide a benchmark for 
evaluating the effect of a major government customer, we first regress covenant intensity on the 
indicator variable of major customers, namely, SaleMajor dummy. The results are presented in 
the first two columns of Panel A. Column 1 reports results for an OLS model and column 2 for a 
Poisson model. We find that the coefficients on SaleMajor dummy are insignificant at the 
conventional levels in both columns (t-statistics equal to -0.759 and -0.962, respectively). These 
results suggest that having a major customer does not affect a firm’s covenant intensity.  
In column 3 of Panel A, we separately investigate in an OLS model the effects of having 
a major government customer, a major corporate customer, and any other major customer on 
covenant intensity. We find that their effects are distinct. The estimated coefficient on SaleGov 
                                                          
15 We drop Log(Maturity) from the control variables when the dependent variable is loan maturity. 
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dummy is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that a firm has fewer loan covenants 
when they report at least 10% of their total sales from the U.S. government than when it does not 
have such a major customer. The effect of SaleGov dummy is also economically significant. The 
estimated coefficient on SaleGov dummy in Column 3 indicates that having the U.S. government 
as a major customer lowers the average number of covenants by 0.7, which accounts for 
approximately 22% of the mean and standard deviation of the number of covenants in the 
sample. In contrast, the estimated coefficient on SaleFirm dummy is statistically insignificant, 
which suggests that a major corporate customer do not have a significant impact on the supplier 
firm’s covenant intensity. The statistical test reported at the bottom of the panel indicates that the 
difference in the coefficients on SaleGov dummy and SaleFirm dummy is statistically significant. 
These results suggest that the effect of a major government customer on covenant intensity is not 
only significantly negative but also significantly more negative than that of a major corporate 
customer.  
The coefficient on SaleOther dummy is significantly positive in column 3 of Panel A, 
suggesting that having other major customers (e.g., individuals and nonprofit organizations) 
actually increases the use of covenants in the borrowing firm’s loan contract. This effect could be 
due to the fact that relying on these other major customers increases the borrowing firm’s 
operating risk and these customers do not have strong incentives or powers to monitor the 
borrowing firm.16 Not surprisingly, the difference in the coefficients on SaleGov dummy and 
SaleOther dummy is statistically significant based on the test reported at the bottom of the panel. 
                                                          
16 Although relying on major corporate customers also increases the supplier firm’s operating risk, these customers 
have incentives and powers to monitor the supplier firm due to their relationship specific investments (e.g., Cornell 
and Shapiro [1987], Hui et al. [2012]). Thus, it is not surprising that a major corporate customer does not have a 
significant impact on covenant intensity. As the economic behaviors of other major customers, such as nonprofit 
organizations, are not well understood, we provide no further explanation for why the effect of SaleOther dummy is 
positive and primarily view this as an empirical fact.  
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Column 4 reports a similar test as in column 3 using a Poisson model. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those in column 3 and lead to the same conclusions.  
The effects of control variables in Table 3, Panel A are largely consistent with prior 
studies (e.g., Graham et al. [2008], Costello and Wittengberg-Moerman [2011], Lou and Otto 
[2015]). For instance, we find significantly negative effects of firm size and market-to-book 
ratio, consistent with firms with lower credit quality having more covenants in their loan 
contracts. The coefficient on Prior covenant is significantly negative in all regressions in Table 
3, Panel A, suggesting that firms with more covenants in the existing loan and bonds have fewer 
covenants in a new loan. This finding is consistent with new lenders benefit from the monitoring 
activities of existing lenders.  
In Panel B of Table 2, we repeat the analyses in Panel A by replacing the indicator 
variables for various major customers with percentage sales from them. Similar to Panel A, the 
results in Panel B show that the percentage sales from all major customers combined 
(SaleMajor%) do not exhibit a significant association with loan covenant intensity. Separating 
SaleMajor% into percentage sales from major government customers (SaleGov%), major 
corporate customers (SaleFirm%), and other major customers (SaleOther%), we find that 
covenant intensity of a loan contract is negatively related to SaleGov% and positively related to 
SaleOther%, and does not seem to have a significant association with SaleFirm%. Further, the 
coefficient on SaleGov% is significantly different from those on SaleFirm% and SaleOther% 
based on the statistical tests reported at the bottom of the panel. The effect of government sales 
on covenant intensity is also economically significant. One standard deviation increase in 
SaleGov% reduces the number of covenants by 0.2, which accounts for around 6% of the mean 
and standard deviation of the number of covenants in the sample. Taken together, the evidence in 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2868761 
23 
 
Table 3 indicates that the existence of a major government customer significantly reduces 
covenant intensity of the supplier firm’s loan contract, while major corporate customers do not 
have such an effect and other major customers have an opposite effect.  
 
5.3 The Effect of Major government Customers on General Covenants and Financial 
Covenants 
Next, we separately examine the effects of a major government customer on the uses of 
general covenants and financial covenants. As Christensen et al. [2016] note, general and 
financial covenants may serve different monitoring roles. By separately examining general and 
financial covenants, we intend to shed light on what category of covenants are affected by major 
government customers. We separate the total number of covenants into the number of general 
covenants and the number of financial covenants, and use each of them as the dependent variable 
in Equation (1).  
Table 4 reports the estimation of equation (1) with the number of general covenants as the 
dependent variable. Panel A shows that the indicator variable of all major customers, SaleMajor 
dummy, is not significantly associated with the number of general covenants in both the OLS and 
Poisson regressions (columns 1 and 2). However, the coefficients on the indicator of government 
sales, SaleGov dummy, are consistently negative and significant in columns 3 and 4, suggesting 
that having a major government customer reduces the number of general covenants. Moreover, 
the coefficients on the indicators of corporate and other major customers, namely, SaleFirm 
dummy and SaleOther dummy, are significantly more positive than that on SaleGov dummy. This 
evidence indicates that a government customer is different from corporate and other major 
customers in terms of its effects on directly restricting managers’ operating, investing, and 
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financing activities in loan contracts. On average, having a major government customer reduces 
the number of general covenants by 0.4, which accounts for about 25% of the average number of 
general covenants in our sample.  
Table 4, Panel B employs the percentage sales from various major customers as the main 
independent variables of interest. Consistent with the results in Panel A, the coefficients on the 
percentage sales to all major customers combined, SaleMajor%, are insignificant, while the 
coefficients on the percentage sales to the major government customer, SaleGov%, are 
significantly negative. The coefficient on SaleGov% in column 3 (coefficient = -0.819, t-statistic 
= -2.650) suggests that a standard deviation increase in government sales (12%) reduces the 
number of general covenants by 0.1, which approximately equals 6% of the average number of 
general covenants in our sample. In general, the evidence in Table 4 reveals that a major 
government customer reduces the restrictions on managerial decisions through general covenants 
in the supplier firm’s loan contract.  
Next, we report in Table 5 the estimation of equation (1) with the number of financial 
covenants as the dependent variable. Panel A relies on the indicator variables of major customers 
as the main variables of interest. The coefficients on SaleMajor dummy are statistically 
insignificant in columns 1 and 2, while the coefficients on SaleGov dummy are significantly 
negative in both columns 3 and 4. The estimated coefficient on SaleGov dummy in the OLS 
regression suggests that having a major government customer lowers the number of financial 
covenants by 0.3 (column 3), which represents 18% of the average number of financial 
covenants in our sample. Panel B of Table 4 presents results based on the percentage sales to 
major customers. The results are generally consistent with those in Panel A. To summarize, the 
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evidence in Tables 4 and 5 indicates that firms have fewer general and financial covenants in 
their loan contracts when they report the U.S. government as a major customer than otherwise.  
 
5.4 The Effect of Major government Customers on the Use of Performance Pricing 
Given that performance pricing is a feature at the loan facility level, we perform this 
analysis at the facility level. As the dependent variable is a dummy variable and the model 
include firm fixed effects, we estimate an OLS model as well as a conditional logit model to 
avoid the incidental parameters problem that would arise in a probit or logit model (Wooldridge 
[2002]). A conditional logit model is not subject to the incidental parameter problem. However, 
it would not allow us to consistently estimate the average marginal effects of the explanatory 
variables (Wooldridge [2002]). Thus, we rely on the OLS model to interpret marginal effects.  
The estimation results are shown in Table 6. Panels A and B present results based on 
major customer dummies and major customer sale percentages, respectively. In columns 1 and 2 
of Panel A, we regress the use of performance pricing on the indicator variable of major 
customers, namely, SaleMajor dummy. We find that the coefficients on SaleMajor dummy are 
insignificant at the conventional levels in both columns. These results suggest that having a 
major customer does not affect a firm’s tendency to have performance pricing provisions. 
However, when we separate major customers into government, corporate, and other major 
customers in columns 3 and 4, the coefficient on SaleGov dummy is significantly negative, 
whereas the coefficients on SaleFirm dummy and SaleOther dummy are statistically insignificant. 
Moreover, the coefficient on SaleGov dummy is significantly more negative than those on 
SaleFirm dummy and SaleOther dummy. The estimated coefficient on SaleGov dummy in column 
3 (-0.071) suggest that firms with major government customers are 7 percentage points more 
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likely to have performance pricing provisions in their loan contracts than other firms. The effect 
is economically significant compared to the average likelihood of using a performance pricing 
provision in our sample (44%).  
The results based on major customer sale percentages in Panel B are qualitatively 
consistent with those based on the dummy variables in Panel A. Collectively, the results in Table 
6 indicate that firms with major government customers are less likely to have performance 
pricing provisions in their loan contracts than other firms, and this effect is significant more 
negative than the effect of major corporate customers.  
 
5.5 The Effect of Major government Customers on Loan Spread, Maturity, and Security 
Next, we examine the effect of major government customers on loan spread, maturity, 
and security. These analyses are performed at the loan facility level. We report the results in 
Table 7. Panels A and B present results based on major customer dummies and major customer 
sale percentages, respectively. To conserve table space, we only report results based on OLS 
models. The results based on conditional logit models for loan security are consistent with those 
based on OLS models (untabulated).  
Panel A shows that the coefficients on SaleGov dummy are insignificant across all 
columns, suggesting that having a major government customer has no significant impact on loan 
spread, maturity, or collateral requirement. The effect of major corporate customers on these loan 
terms is also insignificant. Further, the effect of major government customers is statistically 
indistinguishable from that of major corporate customers.  The results based on major customer 
sale percentages in Panel B are qualitatively consistent with those based on the dummy variables 
in Panel A except that the effect of SaleFirm% on loan security (column 3) becomes 
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significantly negative (it is still statistically indistinguishable from the effect of SaleGov%). 
Collectively, the results in Table 7 indicate that major government customers have no impacts on 
the supplier firm’s loan spread, maturity, and collateral requirement, and their effects are not 
statistically different from those of major corporate customers.  
 
5.6 Instrumental Variable Analysis 
Although our difference-in-difference design in equation (1) helps address the 
endogeneity of a firm’s business relationship with the government, it is still conceivable that 
certain time-variant factors may correlate with both the presence of government customer and 
loan contract terms. If the presence of the government customer is driven by time-variant firm 
specific factors (e.g., higher firm quality), it is likely that these factors will also impact loan 
contract terms. It is arguable that firm characteristics valued by the government customer are 
also likely viewed favorably by creditors. Thus, the change of business relationship with the 
government caused by changes of firm specific characteristics are likely endogenous.  
We employ an instrument variable (IV) analysis to mitigate this concern. To identify 
exogenous change in the presence of the government customer, we explore change in a firm’s 
business transaction with the government caused by the government’s purchase behavior. 
Specifically, we use the total government sales of each three-digit SIC industry scaled by total 
industry sales (Industry SaleGov%) as an instrument variable for our treatment variable SaleGov 
dummy.17 When the government increases purchase from an industry relative to other customers, 
firms in that industry are more likely to have the government as a major customer. Thus, industry 
government sales meet the relevance condition of an IV. On the other hand, it is unlikely that 
                                                          
17 We find qualitatively similar results when the industry government sale is calculated based on four-digit SIC 
industries. 
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industry government sales will affect the loan contract terms of an individual firm after 
controlling for relevant firm characteristics. We estimate equation (1) using a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) analysis. In the first stage, we regress SaleGov dummy on Industry SaleGov% 
and all other explanatory variables in equation (1), including various fixed effects. In the second 
stage, we replace SaleGov dummy in equation (1) with its predicted value from the first stage 
regression and estimate equation (1).18  
We present the estimation results in Table 8. Panel A reports results for the first-stage 
regression, Industry SaleGov% is positively associated with SaleGov dummy and their 
association is statistically significant (Panel A). The high F-statistic (89.17) and partial R2 
(13.2%) reported at the bottom of Panel A suggest that our results do not suffer from the weak 
instrument problem (Larcker and Rusticus [2010]). Panel B reports results for the second-stage 
regression. We continue to find that the existence of the government customer is negatively 
associated with the number of covenants (both general and financial covenants) and the use of 
performance pricing provisions in firms’ loan contracts. The statistical tests reported at the 
bottom of the panel indicate that the differences in the effects of SaleGov dummy and SaleFirm 
dummy (SaleOther dummy) are statistically significant. In contrast, the effects of SaleGov dummy 
on loan spread (column 5), loan maturity (column 6), and collateral requirement (column 7) 
continue to be insignificant and statistically indistinguishable from those of SaleFirm dummy and 
SaleOther dummy.  
The estimated effects of SaleGov dummy on the number of all, general, and financial 
covenants and that on the use of performance pricing provisions are all larger in magnitude than 
their corresponding values in regular OLS regressions in Tables 3 to 6. For instance, the effect of 
                                                          
18 In untabulated analyses, we find similar results using Industry SaleGov% as an IV for SaleGov%, the percentage 
sales from the government customer. 
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of SaleGov dummy on the number of all covenants is –1.456 based on the IV analysis (column 1 
of Table 7, Panel B), compared to –0.690 in a regular OLS regression (column 3 of Table 3, 
Panel A). Therefore, if there is any selection bias in the analyses reported in Tables 3 to 7, the 
bias is against us finding the predicted effects.  
 
5.7 Additional Analysis on the Channel 
While our main goal is to examine the overall effect of major government customers on a 
supplier’s loan contract terms and how it differs from the effect of major corporate customers, 
we also attempt to shed light on whether the negative effect of major government customers on 
covenant intensity and the use of performance pricing is due to lower operating risk associated 
with government sales or enhanced monitoring by government customers. Because loan spread 
and security are very sensitive to the borrowing firms’ credit risk (e.g., Berger and Udell [1990], 
Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder [2008]), the insignificant effect of major government customers on 
loan spread and security suggests that the reduced risk is probably not a major channel. As loan 
covenants and performance pricing are mainly used as monitoring mechanisms to reduce the 
agency problem between borrowers and lenders (Jensen and Meckling [1979], Asquith et al. 
[2005]), the negative effect of major government customers on covenant intensity and 
performance pricing, combine with their insignificant effect on loan spread and security, 
suggests that enhanced monitoring is likely the primary channel.  
To further explore whether major government customers reduce credit risk, we examine 
their effect on the expected default likelihood based on Merton’s model and CDS spread of the 
supplier firm. The results are reported in Table 9. The first two columns include all firm-year 
observations from Compustat, while the estimates in columns 3–4 are based on firm-year 
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observations in our loan sample. Table 9 provides consistent evidence that having major 
government customers does not affect the supplier firm’s credit risk. In fact, major government 
customers are not significantly different from corporate or other major customers in their impacts 
on the supplier’s estimated default likelihood and CDS spread. These results provide further 
evidence for our conjecture that major government customers probably do not affect covenant 
intensity and the use of performance pricing through their effect on credit risk.  
In addition, if the major channel for major government customers to reduce covenant 
intensity and the use of performance pricing is through the reduced risk, we expect for firms with 
major government sales, covenant intensity and the use of performance pricing will be lower if 
the supplier firm has more government sales, because a higher level of government sales will 
reduce operating risk further. In other words, if our results are driven by government sales being 
more stable, we expect to find similar effects of GovSale% in this subsample, because a firm’s 
total revenue should become more stable as its government sales increase. However, we do not 
observe such an effect (untabulated). This finding suggests that our covenant and performance 
pricing results are mainly driven by firms switching from having no major government sales to 
having major government sales. It appears more consistent with the monitoring explanation 
because for this channel what matters is the existence of a major government customer.19  
 
6. Conclusion 
We investigate how a firm’s business relationship with the U.S. government, in 
particular, having the government as a major customer, impacts its loan contracts.  Major 
government customers may affect the supplier firm’s loan contract terms through their effects on 
                                                          
19 However, we acknowledge that the insignificant effect of government sales for the sample of firms with major 
government customers could be also due to the limited test power.  
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the supplier firm’s operating risk and other firm fundamentals, as well as their strict monitoring 
of the supplier firm. We find that a firm’s loan contracts contain fewer covenants and are less 
likely to have a performance pricing provision when it has a major government customer than 
when it has no such a customer. We find qualitative similar results when separately examining 
general and financial covenants, or measuring a firm’s business transaction with the government 
using percentage sales from the government. In contrast, we do not find such an effect for major 
corporate customers. We do not find evidence that government customers affect the supplier 
firm’s loan spread, maturity, or collateral requirement.  
We conjecture that our findings may be primarily due to lenders benefiting from major 
government customers’ strict morning of the supplier firm, not government customers reducing 
credit risk through their positive impacts on firm fundamentals, because we find that having a 
major government customer does not affect loan spread or the likelihood of collateral 
requirement, both of which are sensitive to the borrowing firm’s credit risk. Further, we find that 
major government customers are not associated the supplier firm’s credit risk, measured with the 
estimated default likelihood based on Merton’s model and CDS spreads.   
Our study contributes to the literature on how a firm’s customer base characteristics 
affect firm fundamentals and corporate strategies as well as the literature on debt contracting. It 
highlights the uniqueness of the government as a customer from the perspective of its monitoring 
incentives and effectiveness. Future studies can further explore the impact of the government as 
a customer on other corporate outcomes, such as managerial behaviors and financial reporting.   
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2868761 
32 
 
References 
Aghion, P., and P. Bolton. 1992. An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting. Review of 
Economic Studies 59: 473-494. 
Armstrong, C., W. Guay, and J. Weber, 2010. The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in 
Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50: 179-234. 
Asquith, P., A. Beatty, and J. Weber, 2005. Performance Pricing in Bank Debt Contracts. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 40: 101-28. 
Bangerjee, S., S. Dasgupta, and Y. Kim, 2008. Buyer-Supplier Relationships and the Stakeholder Theory 
of Capital Structure. Journal of Finance 63: 2507-2552. 
Beatty, A., S. Liao, and J. Weber, 2012. Evidence on the Determinants and Economic Consequences of 
Delegated Monitoring. Journal of Accounting and Economics 53: 555-576. 
Becchetti, L., and J. Sierra, 2003. Bankruptcy Risk and Productive Efficiency in Manufacturing Firms. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 27:  2099-2120. 
Berger, A., and G. Udell, 1990. Collateral, Loan Quality, and Bank Risk. Journal of Monetary Economics 
25: 25-42. 
Bertrand, M., and S. Mullainathan. 2003. Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial 
Preferences. Journal of Political Economy 111: 1043-1075. 
Bharath, S., J. Sunder, and S. Sunder, 2008. Accounting Quality and Debt Contracting. The Accounting 
Review 83: 1-28. 
Boot, A., A.V. Thakor, and G.F. Udell. 1991. Credible Commitments, Contract Enforcement Problems 
and Banks: Intermediation as Credibility Assurance. Journal of Banking & Finance 15: 605-632. 
Cameron, A.C., and P.K. Trivedi. 2005. Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications. Cambridge 
University Press.  
Chava, S., and M. Roberts, 2008. How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants. 
Journal of Finance 63: 2085-2121. 
Christensen, H., L. Hail, and C. Leuz. 2013. Capital Market Effects of Securities Regulation: Prior 
Conditions, Implementation, and Enforcement. Working Paper.  
Christensen, H., V. Nikolaev, and R. Witternberg-Moerman, 2016. Accounting Information in Financial 
Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective. Journal of Accounting Research 54: 
397-435. 
Cohen, D., and B. Li., 2016a. Customer-Base Concentration, Profitability and the Information 
Environment: The U.S. Government as a Major Customer. Working paper.  
Cohen, D., and B. Li., 2016b. Why do Firms Hold Less Cash? A Customer Base Explanation. Working 
paper.  
Cohen, L., Coval, J., Malloy, C., 2011. Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Downsizing? Journal of 
Political Economy 119: 1015-1060. 
Cohen, L., Malloy, C., 2015. Mini West Virginia: Corporations as Government Dependents. Working 
paper.  
Cornell, B., and A. Shapiro. 1987. Corporate Stakeholders and Corporate Finance. Financial 
Management 16: 5-14. 
Costello, A., and R. Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011. The Impact of Financial Reporting Quality on Debt 
Contracting: Evidence from Internal Control Weakness Reports. Journal of Accounting Research 
49: 97-136.  
Cull, R., Xu, L.C., 2005. Institutions, Ownership, and Finance: The Determinants of Profit Reinvestment 
among Chinese Firms. Journal of Financial Economics 77, 117-146. 
Demiroglu, C., and C.M. James. 2010. The Information Content of Bank Loan Covenants. Review of 
Financial Studies 23: 3700-3737. 
Dhaliwal, D., Judd, S., Serfling, M., Shaikh, S., 2016. Customer Concentration Risk and the Cost of 
Equity Capital. Journal of Accounting and Economics 61: 23-48.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2868761 
33 
 
Diamond, D., 1984. Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. Review of Economic Studies 51: 
393-414. 
Fama, E., and M. Jensen, 1983. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 
301–325. 
Graham, J., S. Li, and J. Qiu, 2009. Corporate Misreporting and Bank Loan Contracting. Journal of 
Financial Economics 89: 44-61. 
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., So, J., 2013. Politically Connected Boards of Directors and The Allocation of 
Procurement Contracts. Review of Finance 17, 1-32. 
Grossman S., and O. Hart, 1986. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral 
Integration. Journal of Political Economy 94: 691-719.  
Gruca, T, and L. Rego, 2005. Customer Satisfaction, Cash Flow, and Shareholder Value. Journal of 
Marketing 69: 115-130. 
Halchin, L.E., 2012. Overview of the Federal Procurement Process and Resources. Current Politics and 
Economics of the United States, Canada and Mexico 14.1: 1-8. 
Hart, O., and J. Moore, 1988. Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation. Econometrica 56: 755-85.  
Hart, O., and J. Moore, 1990. Property Rights and the Nature of Firm. Journal of Political Economy 98: 
1119-58.  
Holmstrom, B., and J. Tirole. 1997. Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 663-691. 
Houston, J.F., L. Jiang, C. Lin, and Y. Ma. 2014. Political Connections and the Cost of Bank Loans. 
Journal of Accounting Research 52: 193-243. 
Hui, K., S. Klasa, and E. Yeung. 2012. Corporate Suppliers and Customers and Accounting 
Conservatism. Journal of Accounting and Economics 53: 115-135. 
Ittner C., and D. Larcker, 1998. Are Nonfinancial Measures Leading Indicators of Financial Performance? 
An Analysis of Customer Satisfaction. Journal of Accounting Research 36: 1-35.  
Irvine, P., S. Park, and C. Yildizhan, 2016. Customer-Based Concentration, Profitability, and the 
Relationship Life Cycle. The Accounting Review 91: 883-906.  
Jensen, M., and W. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305–60. 
Kim, Y. 1996. Big Customers, Selling Expenses and Profit Margin. Journal of Economic Research 1: 
311-326. 
Khwaja, A.I., Mian, A., 2005. Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an 
Emerging Financial Market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 1371-1411. 
Larcker, D., and T. Rusticus, 2010. On the Use of Instrumental Variables in Accounting Research. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 49: 186-205. 
Lou, Y., and C. Otto, 2015. Debt Heterogeneity and Covenants. Working paper.  
Myers, S. C., 1977. Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 5: 147–76. 
Nagar, V., and M. Rajan, 2005. Measuring Customer Relationships: The Case of Retain Banking 
Industry. Management Science 51: 904-919. 
Patatoukas, P.N., 2012. Customer-Base Concentration: Implications for Firm Performance and Capital 
Markets. The Accounting Review 87, 363-392. 
Rajan, R., and A. Winton.1995. Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor. Journal of Finance 
50: 1113-1146. 
Smith, C., and J. Warner, 1979. On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants. Journal of 
Financial Economics 7: 117–61. 
Stulz, R.M., and H. Johnson. 1985. An Analysis of Secured Debt. Journal of Financial Economics 14: 
501-521. 
Valta, P. 2012. Competition and the Cost of Debt. Journal of Financial Economics 105, 661-682, 
Wooldridge, J. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MIT Press: Cambridge, 
MA.   
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2868761 
34 
 
Appendix A: Anecdotal Evidence 
 
Oshkosh 2012 Annual Report 
 
“The Company made approximately 45%, 56% and 72% of its net sales for fiscal 2012, 2011 
and 2010, respectively, to the U.S. government, a substantial majority of which were under 
multi-year contracts and programs in the defense vehicle market.” 
 
 “The Company, as a U.S. government contractor, is subject to financial audits and other 
reviews by the U.S. government of performance of, and the accounting and general practices 
relating to, U.S. government contracts. Like most large government contractors, the Company is 
audited and reviewed by the government on a continual basis. Costs and prices under such 
contracts may be subject to adjustment based upon the results of such audits and reviews. 
Additionally, such audits and reviews can lead to civil, criminal or administrative proceedings. 
Such proceedings could involve claims by the government for fines, penalties, compensatory and 
treble damages, restitution and/or forfeitures. Under government regulations, a company or one 
or more of its subsidiaries can also be suspended or debarred from government contracts, or 
lose its export privileges based on the results of such proceedings. The Company believes that 
the outcome of all such audits and reviews that are now pending will not have a material adverse 
effect on its financial condition, results of operations or cash flows.” 
 
Halliburton 2003 Annual Report 
 
“The increase in consolidated revenues for 2003 compared to 2002 was largely attributable to 
activity in our government services projects, primarily work in the Middle East. International 
revenues were 73% of total revenues in 2003 and 67% of total revenues in 2002, with the 
increase attributable to our government services projects. The United States Government has 
become a major customer of ours with total revenues of approximately $4.2 billion, or 26% of 
total consolidated revenues, for 2003.” 
 
“Our operations under these contracts are also regularly reviewed and audited by the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency, or DCAA, and other governmental agencies. When issues are found 
during the governmental agency audit process, these issues are typically discussed and reviewed 
with us in order to reach a resolution. 
 
The results of a preliminary audit by the DCAA in December 2003 alleged that we may have 
overcharged the Department of Defense by $61 million in importing fuel into Iraq. After a 
review, the Army Corps of Engineers, which is our client and oversees the project, concluded 
that we obtained a fair price for the fuel. However, Department of Defense officials have 
referred the matter to the agency’s inspector general with a request for additional investigation 
by the agency’s criminal division. We understand that the agency’s inspector general has 
commenced an investigation. We have also in the past had inquiries by the DCAA and the civil 
fraud division of the United States Department of Justice into possible overcharges for work 
under a contract performed in the Balkans, which is still under review with the Department of 
Justice.”  
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Major customer measures 
 
 
SaleMajor% Sales to all major customers as percentage of total sales 
SaleMajor dummy A dummy variable equal to one if a firm has a least one major customer and 
zero otherwise. 
SaleGov% Sales to the U.S. government as a major customer as percentage of total sales 
SaleGov dummy A dummy variable equal to one if a firm has the U.S. government as a major 
customer and zero otherwise. 
SaleFirm% Sales to major corporate customers as a percentage of total sales 
SaleFirm dummy A dummy variable equal to one if a firm has a least one major corporate 
customer and zero otherwise. 
SaleOther% Sales to other major customers as a percentage of total sales 
SaleOther dummy A dummy variable equal to one if a firm has a least one non-corporate non-
major government customer and zero otherwise. 
Industry SaleGov% The total government sales of each three-digit SIC industry scaled by total 
industry sales.  
Other firm characteristics 
 
 
Cash flow volatility Standard deviation of quarterly cash flows from operations over the 12 prior 
quarters divided by sales  
Credit rating Numeric values assigned to firm ratings issued by S&P’s ranging from1 to 23 
with the rating “AAA”  
equal to “1". If a firm is unrated, it takes the value 0. 
Market to book Market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets  
Leverage Long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by total assets  
Tangibility Net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets 
Total assets Book value of total assets 
Prior covenants Total number of prior covenants already specified in a firm’s existing loans and 
bonds outstanding  
when a new loan or bond is issued  
Profitability Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization divided by total 
assets 
Default probability Estimated probability of default based on the Merton model 
Log (CDS spread) Logarithm of credit default swap spreads from Markit 
 
Loan characteristics 
 
 
All covenants Total number of covenants included in the loan contract 
Financial covenants Total number of financial covenants included in the loan contract 
General covenants Total number of general covenants included in the loan contract 
  
Loan amount Face value of the loan 
Loan maturity  Maturity of the loan  
Loan spread Difference between the interest rate on a loan and the LIBOR for loans; 
difference between the yield at issuance of a bond and the yield of a Treasury 
bill with matched maturity for bonds 
Loan security  Dummy variable that equals one if a debt instrument is backed by collateral 
Performance pricing  Dummy variable that equals one if a loan has a performance pricing clause 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Firm characteristics 
 
       
SaleMajor dummy 10,671 0.69 1.00 0.46 
SaleGov dummy 10,671 0.09 0.00 0.28 
SaleFirm dummy 10,671 0.46 0.00 0.50 
SaleOther dummy 10,671 0.24 0.00 0.43 
SaleMajor% 10,671 0.33 0.26 0.32 
SaleGov% 10,671 0.03 0.00 0.12 
SaleFirm% 10,671 0.17 0.00 0.23 
SaleOther% 10,671 0.14 0.00 0.28 
SaleMajor% (SaleMajor%>0) 7,396 0.48 0.44 0.28 
SaleGov% (SaleGov%>0) 931 0.38 0.35 0.20 
SaleFirm% (SaleFirm%>0) 4,954 0.36 0.31 0.22 
SaleOther% (SaleOther%>0) 2,543 0.57 0.56 0.28 
Industry SaleGov% 10,671 0.03 0.00 0.08 
     
Total assets (mills) 10,671 4,527 932 10,776 
Log(Assets) 10,671 6.85 6.84 1.86 
Leverage 10,671 0.29 0.26 0.21 
Tangibility 10,671 0.30 0.23 0.24 
Profitability 10,671 0.13 0.13 0.10 
Market to book 10,671 1.73 1.46 0.96 
Cash flow volatility 10,671 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Prior covenants 10,671 8.04 7.00 7.29 
Unrated 10,671 0.50 1.00 0.50 
Credit rating  5,289 10.72 11.00 3.46 
 
    
Loan characteristics 
     
Loan amount (mills) 10,671 415 188 636 
Log(Amount)  10,671 5.05 5.24 1.58 
Loan maturity (months) 10,671 46.39 49.00 24.17 
Log(Maturity) 10,671 3.65 3.89 0.70 
All covenants 10,671 3.25 3.00 3.19 
Financial covenants 10,671 1.64 2.00 1.51 
General covenants 10,671 1.61 1.00 2.14 
Loan spread 13,026 2.03 1.75 1.24 
Loan security 11,545 0.75 1.00 0.47 
Performance pricing 15,870 0.44 0.00 0.50 
 
This table presents summary statistics of our sample of 10,671 loan packages issued by 2,183 firms over 
the time period of 1995-2014. The descriptive statistics of performance pricing, loan spread and loan 
security are at the facility level. Variable definitions are in Appendix B.  
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Table 2. Industry Distribution 
 
Industry name N Percentage SaleGov dummy SaleFirm dummy SaleGov% SaleFirm% 
Consumer NonDurables 974 9.13% 0.00 0.62 0.04% 20.70% 
Consumer Durables 508 4.76% 0.04 0.52 1.40% 18.58% 
Manufacturing 1,964 18.41% 0.10 0.44 3.56% 13.67% 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 1,066 9.99% 0.01 0.80 0.15% 32.77% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 438 4.10% 0.01 0.38 0.18% 12.19% 
Business Equipment 1,751 16.41% 0.15 0.43 6.00% 15.75% 
Telephone and Television Transmission 228 2.14% 0.01 0.36 0.55% 11.06% 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 991 9.29% 0.05 0.31 1.49% 9.93% 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 971 9.10% 0.22 0.38 8.94% 15.36% 
Other 1,780 16.68% 0.10 0.39 3.58% 14.44% 
 
This table reports the industry (Fama-French 12 industries) distribution of our sample of 10,671 loan packages issued by 2,183 firms over the time 
period of 1995–2014. 
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Table 3. The Effect of Government Customer on Covenant Intensity 
 
Panel A. The Presence of Major Government Customers 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
All covenants 
SaleMajor dummy –0.063 –0.025 
  
 
(–0.784) (–0.983) 
  
SaleGov dummy 
  
–0.690*** –0.184*** 
 
  
(–3.260) (–3.110) 
SaleFirm dummy 
  
–0.132 –0.033 
 
  
(–1.424) (–1.197) 
SaleOther dummy 
  
0.221** 0.054* 
 
  
(2.410) (1.702) 
Log (Assets) –0.421*** –0.146*** –0.422*** –0.146*** 
 
(–5.200) (–5.854) (–5.219) (–5.889) 
Leverage 0.122 –0.001 0.099 –0.004 
 
(0.395) (–0.007) (0.324) (–0.044) 
Tangibility –0.139 –0.071 –0.092 –0.070 
 
(–0.253) (–0.429) (–0.167) (–0.424) 
Profitability 0.608 0.080 0.590 0.074 
 
(1.398) (0.553) (1.357) (0.514) 
Market to book –0.128** –0.046*** –0.129** –0.047*** 
 
(–2.513) (–2.786) (–2.537) (–2.813) 
Cash flow volatility –1.099 –0.421 –1.079 –0.420 
 
(–1.067) (–1.271) (–1.047) (–1.268) 
Prior covenant –0.020** –0.004 –0.021** –0.004 
 
(–2.268) (–1.533) (–2.341) (–1.624) 
Log (Amount) 0.562*** 0.199*** 0.565*** 0.198*** 
 
(11.490) (10.911) (11.644) (10.927) 
Log (Maturity) –0.082 –0.032 –0.086 –0.033 
 
(–1.154) (–1.306) (–1.215) (–1.318) 
Fixed effects:  
    
Credit Rating Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type & Purpose  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm &Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
No. of observations 10671 10671 10,671 10,671 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.524 0.302 0.525 0.303 
P-value for testing 
    0.016 0.024 
SaleGov dummy = SaleFirm dummy 
P-value for testing 
  
0.001 0.001 
SaleGov dummy = SaleOther dummy 
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Panel B. The Percentage of Government Sales 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
All covenants 
SaleMajor% –0.018 –0.013 
  
 
(–0.153) (–0.348) 
  
SaleGov% 
  
–1.563*** –0.371*** 
 
  
(–3.488) (–3.314) 
SaleFirm% 
  
–0.293 –0.074 
 
  
(–1.352) (–1.158) 
SaleOther% 
  
0.369*** 0.102** 
 
  
(2.683) (2.193) 
 
    
Control variables: Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects:  
    
Credit Rating Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type & Purpose  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm &Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
No. of observations 10,671 10,671 10,671 10671 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.524 0.302 0.525 0.303 
P-value for testing 
    0.010 0.021 
SaleGov% = SaleFirm% 
P-value for testing 
  
0.000 0.000 
SaleGov% = SaleOther% 
 
This table presents results for the effect of a firm’s business transaction with the government on covenant 
intensity of its loan contract. The dependent variable is the number of loan covenants. Panel A presents 
results for the existence of major government customers. Panel B presents results for percentage sales to 
major government customers. All regressions include credit rating, loan type and purpose, firm and year 
fixed effects. t-statistics are in parentheses below parameter estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 4. The Effect of Government Customer on the Number of General Covenants 
 
Panel A. The Presence of Major Government Customers 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
General covenants 
SaleMajor dummy –0.058 –0.046 
  
 
(–1.052) (–1.260) 
  
SaleGov dummy 
  
–0.432*** –0.230*** 
   
(–3.066) (–2.897) 
SaleFirm dummy 
  
–0.092 –0.050 
   
(–1.455) (–1.279) 
SaleOther dummy 
  
0.145** 0.064 
   
(2.337) (1.390) 
Log (Assets) –0.271*** –0.188*** –0.272*** –0.188*** 
 
(–4.882) (–5.493) (–4.907) (–5.505) 
Leverage 0.273 0.102 0.260 0.100 
 
(1.286) (0.897) (1.232) (0.885) 
Tangibility –0.276 –0.199 –0.246 –0.200 
 
(–0.748) (–0.900) (–0.666) (–0.900) 
Profitability –0.145 –0.189 –0.156 –0.197 
 
(–0.465) (–0.888) (–0.502) (–0.931) 
Market to book –0.066* –0.058** –0.067* –0.058** 
 
(–1.883) (–2.399) (–1.897) (–2.407) 
Cash flow volatility –0.485 –0.411 –0.469 –0.405 
 
(–0.733) (–0.926) (–0.708) (–0.914) 
Prior covenant –0.009 –0.001 –0.009 –0.001 
 
(–1.473) (–0.240) (–1.533) (–0.324) 
Log (Amount) 0.373*** 0.257*** 0.375*** 0.257*** 
 
(11.344) (10.606) (11.487) (10.603) 
Log (Maturity) –0.082* –0.075** –0.084* –0.075** 
 
(–1.663) (–2.284) (–1.717) (–2.299) 
Fixed effects:  
    
Credit Rating Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type & Purpose  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm &Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
No. of observations 10,671 10,671 10,671 10,671 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.505 0.344 0.506 0.345 
P-value for testing  
    0.027 0.043 
SaleGov dummy = SaleFirm dummy 
P-value for testing  
  
0.001 0.002 
SaleGov dummy = SaleOther dummy 
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Panel B. The Percentage of Government Sales 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
General covenants 
SaleMajor% –0.027 –0.033 
  
 
(–0.341) (–0.626) 
  
SaleGov% 
  
–0.835*** –0.383** 
   
(–2.700) (–2.396) 
SaleFirm% 
  
–0.242 –0.125 
   
(–1.596) (–1.403) 
SaleOther% 
  
0.215** 0.105 
   
(2.393) (1.638) 
     
Control variables: Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects:  
    
Credit Rating Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type & Purpose  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm &Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
No. of observations 10,671 10,671 10,671 10,671 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.505 0.344 0.506 0.345 
P-value for testing:  
    0.082 0.156 
SaleGov% = SaleFirm% 
P-value for testing:  
  
0.001 0.004 
SaleGov% = SaleOther% 
 
This table presents results for the effect of a firm’s business transaction with the government on the 
number of general covenants in its loan contracts. The dependent variable is the number of general 
covenants. General covenants, also known as negative and affirmative covenants, directly restrict 
managers’ decisions on operating, investing, and financing activities by specifying actions to be taken or 
not taken in certain situations. Panel A presents results for the existence of major government customers. 
Panel B presents results for percentage sales to major government customers. All regressions include 
credit rating, loan type and purpose, firm and year fixed effects. t-statistics are in parentheses below 
parameter estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. All variable are defined in Appendix B.  
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Table 5. The Effect of Government Customer on the Number of Financial Covenants 
 
Panel A. The Presence of Major Government Customers 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Financial covenants 
SaleMajor dummy –0.005 –0.004 
  
 
(–0.126) (–0.175) 
  
SaleGov dummy 
  
–0.258*** –0.140** 
   
(–2.581) (–2.394) 
SaleFirm dummy 
  
–0.040 –0.018 
   
(–0.864) (–0.666) 
SaleOther dummy 
  
0.076 0.042 
   
(1.567) (1.296) 
Log (Assets) –0.150*** –0.102*** –0.150*** –0.102*** 
 
(–3.741) (–4.128) (–3.740) (–4.146) 
Leverage –0.152 –0.107 –0.161 –0.111 
 
(–1.094) (–1.328) (–1.170) (–1.373) 
Tangibility 0.138 0.044 0.154 0.046 
 
(0.546) (0.282) (0.612) (0.295) 
Profitability 0.753*** 0.330** 0.746*** 0.327** 
 
(3.279) (2.272) (3.257) (2.252) 
Market to book –0.062** –0.035** –0.062** –0.035** 
 
(–2.384) (–2.117) (–2.409) (–2.147) 
Cash flow volatility –0.614 –0.501 –0.610 –0.504 
 
(–1.184) (–1.485) (–1.178) (–1.494) 
Prior covenant –0.012*** –0.006*** –0.012*** –0.007*** 
 
(–2.770) (–2.612) (–2.834) (–2.684) 
Log (Amount) 0.190*** 0.134*** 0.191*** 0.134*** 
 
(8.345) (7.625) (8.423) (7.624) 
Log (Maturity) –0.001 0.010 –0.002 0.010 
 
(–0.018) (0.408) (–0.067) (0.398) 
Fixed effects:  
    
Credit Rating Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type & Purpose  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm &Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
No. of observations 10,671 10,671 10,671 10,671 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.520 0.229 0.520 0.229 
P-value for testing:  
    0.052 0.071 
SaleGov dummy = SaleFirm dummy 
P-value for testing:  
  
0.004 0.011 SaleGov dummy = SaleOther 
dummy 
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Panel B. The Percentage of Government Sales 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Financial covenants 
SaleMajor% 0.009 0.004 
  
 
(0.146) (0.112) 
  
SaleGov% 
  
–0.728*** –0.364*** 
   
(–3.467) (–3.421) 
SaleFirm% 
  
–0.051 –0.023 
   
(–0.496) (–0.385) 
SaleOther% 
  
0.155** 0.098* 
   
(1.983) (1.909) 
     
Control variables: Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects:  
    
Credit Rating Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type & Purpose  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm &Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
No. of observations 10,671 10,671 10,671 10,671 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.520 0.229 0.521 0.229 
P-value for testing:  
    0.004 0.006 
SaleGov% = SaleFirm% 
P-value for testing:  
  
0.000 0.000 
SaleGov% = SaleOther% 
 
This table presents results for the effect of a firm’s business transaction with the government on the 
number of general covenants in its loan contracts. The dependent variable is the number of general 
covenants. Financial covenants, such as interest coverage and net worth covenants, require firms to 
adhere to a predetermined level of accounting performance. Panel A presents results for the existence of 
major government customers. Panel B presents results for percentage sales to major government 
customers. All regressions include credit rating, loan type and purpose, firm and year fixed effects. t-
statistics are in parentheses below parameter estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variable are defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 6. The Effect of Government Customer on the Use of Performance Pricing 
 
Panel A. The Presence of Major Government Customers 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Performance pricing 
SaleMajor dummy –0.003 –0.025 
  
 
(–0.180) (–0.305) 
  
SaleGov dummy 
  
–0.071** –0.452** 
 
  
(–2.367) (–2.531) 
SaleFirm dummy 
  
–0.009 –0.063 
 
  
(–0.600) (–0.688) 
SaleOther dummy 
  
–0.004 –0.039 
 
  
(–0.253) (–0.394) 
Log (Assets) 0.016 0.080 0.017 0.081 
 
(1.299) (1.040) (1.319) (1.062) 
Leverage –0.117*** –0.599** –0.120*** –0.617** 
 
(–2.684) (–2.279) (–2.769) (–2.347) 
Tangibility –0.009 –0.286 –0.008 –0.285 
 
(–0.104) (–0.562) (–0.089) (–0.562) 
Profitability 0.314*** 2.183*** 0.309*** 2.182*** 
 
(3.999) (4.095) (3.923) (4.085) 
Market to book –0.016* –0.093 –0.016* –0.094 
 
(–1.784) (–1.591) (–1.795) (–1.604) 
Cash flow volatility 0.062 0.517 0.056 0.494 
 
(0.376) (0.520) (0.337) (0.497) 
Prior covenant –0.001 –0.011 –0.001 –0.012 
 
(–1.056) (–1.482) (–1.103) (–1.572) 
Log (Amount) 0.047*** 0.287*** 0.047*** 0.288*** 
 
(9.117) (8.930) (9.159) (8.974) 
Log (Maturity) 0.051*** 0.287*** 0.051*** 0.285*** 
 
(5.748) (4.778) (5.701) (4.749) 
Fixed effects:  
    
Credit Rating Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type & Purpose  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm &Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model 
OLS Conditional 
Logit 
OLS Conditional 
Logit 
No. of observations 15,870 12,585 15,870 12,585 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.436 0.172 0.436 0.174 
P-value for testing 
    0.070 0.057 SaleGov dummy = SaleFirm 
dummy 
P-value for testing 
  
0.068 0.055 SaleGov dummy = SaleOther 
dummy 
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Panel B. The Percentage of Government Sales 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Performance pricing 
SaleMajor% –0.003 –0.043 
  
 
(–0.141) (–0.347) 
  
SaleGov% 
  
–0.171*** –1.004*** 
 
  
(–3.205) (–3.219) 
SaleFirm% 
  
0.002 0.000 
 
  
(0.043) (0.002) 
SaleOther% 
  
0.023 0.099 
 
  
(0.849) (0.603) 
 
    
Control variables: Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects:  
    
Credit Rating Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type & Purpose  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm &Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model 
OLS Conditional 
Logit 
OLS Conditional 
Logit 
No. of observations 15,870 12,585 15,870 12,585 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.436 0.172 0.436 0.173 
P-value for testing 
    0.007 0.008 
SaleGov% = SaleFirm% 
P-value for testing 
  
0.001 0.002 
SaleGov% = SaleOther% 
 
This table presents results for the effect of a firm’s business transaction with the government on the use of 
performance pricing in its loan contract. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if a loan contract includes a performance pricing provision, and 0 otherwise. The sample sizes 
of the conditional Logit models are smaller than those of the OLS models because firms for which the 
value of the outcome variable does not change across loans cannot be included in the conditional Logit 
estimations. Panel A presents results for the existence of major government customers. Panel B presents 
results for percentage sales to major government customers. All regressions include credit rating, loan 
type and purpose, firm and year fixed effects. t-statistics are in parentheses below parameter estimates. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables 
are defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 7. The Effect of Government Customer on Loan Spread, Loan Maturity, and 
Collateral Requirement 
 
Panel A. The Presence of Major Government Customers 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
Loan spread Loan maturity Loan security  
SaleGov dummy 0.027 –0.037 –0.012 
 
(0.285) (–1.232) (–0.473) 
SaleFirm dummy –0.045 –0.001 –0.018 
 
(–1.256) (–0.056) (–1.444) 
SaleOther dummy –0.049 –0.007 0.013 
 
(–1.523) (–0.421) (0.863) 
Log (Assets) –0.187*** 0.009 –0.060*** 
 
(–5.738) (0.673) (–5.408) 
Leverage 0.709*** –0.156*** 0.086** 
 
(6.829) (–2.938) (2.381) 
Tangibility 0.238 0.002 –0.093 
 
(1.151) (0.017) (–1.352) 
Profitability –1.989*** 0.435*** –0.214*** 
 
(–8.280) (4.130) (–3.578) 
Market to book –0.074*** –0.012 –0.030*** 
 
(–3.443) (–1.188) (–3.634) 
Cash flow volatility –0.098 0.099 –0.006 
 
(–0.230) (0.420) (–0.047) 
Prior covenant –0.004 –0.001 0.001 
 
(–1.370) (–0.736) (1.023) 
Log (Amount) –0.073*** 0.064*** –0.026*** 
 
(–5.194) (10.034) (–5.692) 
Log (Maturity) –0.045 
 
0.018** 
 
(–1.574) 
 
(2.022) 
Fixed effects:  
 
 
 
Credit Rating Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type & Purpose  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm &Year  Yes Yes Yes 
Model OLS OLS OLS 
No. of observations 13,026 15,870 11,545 
Adj. R2 0.725 0.631 0.741 
P-value for testing  
0.516 0.292 0.857 
SaleGov dummy = SaleFirm dummy 
P-value for testing  
0.474 0.422 0.421 
SaleGov dummy = SaleOther dummy 
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Panel B. The Percentage of Government Sales 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
Loan spread Loan maturity Loan security  
SaleGov% –0.017 –0.070 –0.039 
 
(–0.103) (–1.068) (–0.722) 
SaleFirm% –0.110 –0.015 –0.071** 
 
(–1.186) (–0.392) (–2.573) 
SaleOther% –0.026 0.012 0.025 
 
(–0.504) (0.482) (1.133) 
  
 
 
Control variables: Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects:  
 
 
 
Credit Rating Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type & Purpose  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm &Year  Yes Yes Yes 
Model OLS OLS OLS 
No. of observations 13,026 15,870 11,545 
Adj. R2 0.725 0.631 0.741 
P-value for testing: 
0.639 0.475 0.594 
SaleGov% = SaleFirm% 
P-value for testing:   
0.958 0.241 0.260 
SaleGov% = SaleOther% 
 
This table presents results for the effect of a firm’s business transaction with the government on interest 
spread, loan maturity, and collateral requirement. The analyses are at loan facility level. The sample size 
varies depending on the availability of the dependent variable. Panel A presents results for the existence 
of major government customers. Panel B presents results for percentage sales to major government 
customers. All regressions include credit rating, loan type and purpose, firm and year fixed effects. t-
statistics are in parentheses below parameter estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variable are defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 8. The Effect of Government Customer on Loan Contract Terms: Instrumental 
Variable Analysis 
 
Panel A: First-stage results 
Variable SaleGov dummy 
Industry SaleGov% 1.117*** 
 
(9.44) 
SaleFirm dummy 0.001 
 
(0.05) 
SaleOther dummy 0.047*** 
 
(3.53) 
Log(Total assets) 0.003 
 
(0.27) 
Leverage –0.024 
 
(–0.78) 
Tangibility 0.043 
 
(0.21) 
Profitability –0.061* 
 
(–1.71) 
Market to book 0.001 
 
(0.26) 
Cash flow volatility –0.035 
 
(–0.54) 
Prior covenant –0.001 
 
(–0.76) 
Log (Amount) 0.001 
 
(0.23) 
Log (Maturity) –0.007 
 
(–1.62) 
Fixed effects:  
 
Credit Rating Yes 
Loan Type & Purpose  Yes 
Firm&Year Fixed Effects Yes 
N 10,671 
R-squared 0.779 
F-statistic 89.171 
Partial R-squared 0.132 
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Panel B: Second-Stage Results    
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Variable All 
covenants 
General 
covenants 
Financial 
covenants 
Performance 
pricing 
Loan 
 spread 
Loan 
maturity 
Loan  
security 
Predicted SaleGov dummy –1.456*** –0.666** –0.790*** –0.152* 0.045 0.040 –0.022 
 (–3.12) (–2.01) (–3.35) (–1.94) (0.24) (0.49) (–0.31) 
SaleFirm dummy –0.121 –0.09 –0.032 –0.008 –0.045  –0.002 –0.018 
 (–1.28) (–1.39) (–0.69) (–0.51) (–1.27)  (–0.14) (–1.43) 
SaleOther dummy 0.268*** 0.160** 0.109** 0.001 –0.050 –0.012 0.014 
 (2.82) (2.50) (2.13) (0.07) (–1.48) (–0.69) (0.90) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects:  
    
   Credit Rating Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type & Purpose  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm & Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
N 10,671 10,671 10,671 15,870 13,026 15,870 11,545 
R-squared 0.524 0.506 0.518 0.436 0.724 0.631 0.741 
P-value for testing  
0.006 0.095 0.002 0.075 0.644 0.618 0.951 SaleGov dummy = SaleFirm 
dummy 
P-value for testing  
0.001 0.020 0.001 0.076 0.634 0.562 0.638 SaleGov dummy = SaleOther 
dummy 
 
This table presents results for the effect of a firm’s business transaction with the government on loan covenants, interest spread, loan maturity, 
collateral requirement, and the use of performance pricing provision in its loan contracts using an 2SLS approach. We use total government sales 
as a percentage of total sales in each three-digit SIC industry (Industry SaleGov%) as the instrument for SaleGov dummy. Panel A presents the 
first-stage OLS regression results.  Panel B presents the second-stage OLS regression results using the predicted value of SaleGov dummy from the 
first-stage regression as the treatment variable. The regressions for covenants (columns 1 to 3) are performed at the loan package level. Other 
regressions are performed at the loan facility level. All regressions include credit rating, loan type and purpose, firm and year fixed effects. t-
statistics are in parentheses below parameter estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
All variable are defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 9. The Effect of Government Customer on Credit Risk 
 
   Compustat sample Loan sample 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Default 
probability 
Log (CDS 
spread) 
Default 
probability 
Log (CDS 
spread) 
SaleGov dummy 0.181 0.005 0.252 0.002 
 
(0.528) (0.967) (0.535) (0.232) 
SaleFirm dummy –0.079 0.002 –0.146 0.006 
 
(–0.424) (0.529) (–0.422) (1.056) 
SaleOther dummy 0.236 0.002 0.280 –0.001 
 
(1.393) (0.726) (0.938) (–0.173) 
Log (Assets) –0.758*** 0.004 –0.332 –0.001 
 
(–4.895) (1.106) (–1.082) (–0.194) 
Leverage 8.786*** 0.024* 6.437*** 0.012 
 
(9.496) (1.910) (5.568) (0.611) 
Tangibility 3.296*** –0.032 4.509** –0.017 
 
(2.864) (–1.335) (1.995) (–0.452) 
Profitability –6.866*** 0.008 –12.375*** –0.010 
 
(–9.228) (0.428) (–3.767) (–0.251) 
Market to book –0.503*** 0.003 –0.034 –0.002 
 
(–6.872) (1.467) (–0.320) (–0.783) 
Cash flow volatility –0.189* –0.046 –2.092 –0.077 
 
(–1.815) (–1.633) (–0.757) (–1.217) 
Firm &Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS 
No. of observations 43,626 1,709 7,986 754 
Adj. R2 0.116 0.068 0.141 0.085 
P-value for testing:  
0.521 0.593 0.489 0.784 SaleGov dummy = SaleFirm 
dummy 
P-value for testing:  
0.887 0.611 0.961 0.771 SaleGov dummy = SaleOther 
dummy 
This table presents results for the effect of a firm’s business transaction with the government on its credit 
risk. The dependent variable is the estimated probability of default based on the Merton model in columns 
(1) and (3), and the logarithm of credit default swap spread in columns (2) and (4). We use all firm-year 
observations from Compustat from 1995 to 2014 in columns (1) and (2). In columns (3) and (4), we 
restrict the sample to the unique firm-year observations that appear in our loan sample. t-statistics are in 
parentheses below parameter estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. All variable are defined in Appendix B. 
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